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PATH TO A POPULAR VOTE: THE IMPACT OF
STATE FAITHLESS ELECTOR STATUTES ON
THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN
Laura LaBrecque*
INTRODUCTION
Desire to reform the Electoral College is not at all novel, nor is
the debate over the correct way to do so. Since its inception as one of
the most significant compromises to come out of the Constitutional
Convention, the Electoral College has been consistently challenged by
politicians, scholars, and the American people.1 As the United States
has become even more polarized, and after two presidential elections
in recent memory, in 2000 and 2016, when the winner of the Electoral
College did not win the popular vote, outcries for Electoral College
reform remain as fervent as ever.2
One effort to change the Electoral College is the National Popular
Vote Plan, an agreement between states to install a national popular
vote without constitutional amendment; once enough states join for
the plan to become effective, states’ electors will cast their ballots for
the national popular vote winner regardless of the vote leader in their
state.3 The plan purports to solve the issues inherent in the winnertake-all Electoral College system, where votes cast in different states
have an unequal impact, states yield different levels of power in the
presidential election, and presidential candidates need only focus their
* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science,
Boston University, 2018. Special thanks to Professor Aaron Caplan for his immense guidance and
helpful suggestions throughout the writing process, and thank you to the members of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review for all their hard work throughout the production cycle.
1. See Brandon H. Robb, Comment, Making the Electoral College Work Today: The
Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 54 LOY. L. REV.
419, 427 (2008).
2. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Opinion, Getting Rid of the Electoral College Isn’t Just About
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/opinion/electoralcollege-warren-trump.html.
3. Robb, supra note 1, at 453–55. Throughout this Note, I will use the term “Electors” to
mean members of the Electoral College.
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campaign efforts on certain parts of the country.4 Because the plan
does not replace the Electoral College, though, and rather utilizes
members of the Electoral College who vote for the national popular
vote winner, the plan by itself does not solve all issues with the
Electoral College.5
Notably, the National Popular Vote Plan could be complicated by
the recent uptick in “faithless Electors.” While faithless Electors, who
vote for a presidential candidate other than the winner of the popular
vote in their state for various reasons, have not yet impacted a
presidential election, these Electors have the ability to completely
undermine the plan by voting for someone other than the national
popular vote winner.6 To combat faithless Electors, states have
enacted laws attempting to bind their Electors into voting for the
popular vote winner in the state.7 These Elector-binding statutes could
ensure the effectiveness of the National Popular Vote Plan.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Chiafalo v. Washington8
established that states can enforce their Elector-binding statutes to
ensure faithful votes.9 This Note provides a new categorization of the
state Elector-binding statutes, focusing on the statutes’ enforcement
mechanisms to determine which types of statutes would most
effectively ensure that the National Popular Vote Plan works. The
statutes are divided into three types: “Honor System” statutes that
either merely state that the Elector must vote for the candidate who
wins the popular vote in the state or require the Elector to take a pledge
to that effect;10 “Replacement” statutes, which mandate that if the
Elector votes for someone other than the candidate who wins the
popular vote, the Elector will be replaced;11 and “Penalty” statutes that

4. JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE
PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 11 (4th ed. 2013), http://www.every-voteequal.com/sites/default/files/everyvoteequal-4th-ed-2013-02-21.pdf.
5. Id. at xxxviii (“The concept has too often been referred to by opponents as a ‘partisan’ or
even ‘liberal’ effort to eliminate the Electoral College in an attempt to tarnish the issue and scare
away those of us on the right side of the political spectrum. But this description could not be further
from the truth.”).
6. Robert W. Bennett, The Problem of the Faithless Elector: Trouble Aplenty Brewing Just
Below the Surface in Choosing the President, 100 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 121, 130 (2006).
7. See infra Part III and Appendix A.
8. 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
9. Id. at 2320.
10. See Appendix A, Table 1.
11. See Appendix A, Table 2.
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impose a penalty on Electors for voting for someone other than the
candidate who wins the popular vote in the state.12
This Note argues that states should enact Elector-binding statutes
that require the replacement of Electors who vote faithlessly.
Additionally, this Note contends that regardless of whether the
National Popular Vote Plan were enacted, the enforceability of state
Elector-binding statutes allows states to remove political parties from
the process of appointing Electors.
Part I of this Note presents background information on the
National Popular Vote Plan and the history of faithless votes in the
Electoral College. Part II then describes the three Supreme Court
decisions that establish the constitutionality of state Elector-binding
statutes and their enforcement, McPherson v. Blacker,13 Ray v. Blair,14
and Chiafalo v. Washington. Part III provides a new categorization of
state Elector-binding statutes, charted in Appendices A and B. Finally,
Part IV considers the implications of the Chiafalo decision on the
National Popular Vote Plan’s effectiveness, analyzes which types of
state Elector-binding statutes would best allow the National Popular
Vote Plan to work, and considers whether political parties need be
included in state Elector appointment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The National Popular Vote Plan
In the mid to late 1900s, Congress repeatedly attempted to reform
the Electoral College through constitutional amendment, but the
barriers to amending the Constitution proved too strong.15 Given the
unlikelihood of amendment, toward the end of the century, momentum
towards changing or abolishing the Electoral College all but died.16
However, following the incredibly close 2000 presidential election,
which marked the fourth time in American history that the winner of

12.
13.
14.
15.

See Appendix A, Table 3.
146 U.S. 1 (1892).
343 U.S. 214 (1952).
THOMAS H. NEALE & ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43823, THE NATIONAL
POPULAR VOTE (NPV) INITIATIVE: DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT BY INTERSTATE
COMPACT 4 (2019).
16. See Robb, supra note 1, at 452.
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the presidential election did not win the popular vote, the movement
resurged.17
As a direct result of the rising frustrations with the Electoral
College, and in an attempt to circumvent the challenging constitutional
amendment process, three law professors created the National Popular
Vote Plan (NPV).18 The NPV does not eliminate the Electoral College,
but seeks to take advantage of the states’ constitutional power to
appoint Electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct.”19 Under the NPV, individual state legislatures adopt the
“Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National
Popular Vote,” which prescribes that the state shall award all of its
Electoral votes to the presidential candidate who wins the national
popular vote.20 The individual state statutes then only take effect when
enough states join the plan to ensure the national popular vote winner
will have the requisite 270 Electoral votes.21 At present, the NPV has
been adopted by fifteen states and the District of Columbia, for a total
of 195 Electoral votes.22 Appendix B following this Note contains a
table listing which states have adopted the NPV thus far.23
In the event that a sufficient number of states join the NPV such
that it is enacted, the mechanics of the plan, as enacted by the member

17. NEALE & NOLAN, supra note 15, at 5, 15. The first time the winner of the presidential
election did not win the popular vote was the election of 1824, where Andrew Jackson secured a
plurality of the votes, but John Quincy Adams won the Electoral College. Jerry Schwartz,
Explainer: They Lost the Popular Vote but Won the Elections, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 31, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/AP-explains-elections-popular-vote-743f5cb6c70fce9489c9926a90785
5eb. The next time this occurred was in the election of 1876. Id. Rutherford B. Hayes won the
Electoral College, leaving Samuel Tilden with the popular vote win just shy of the requisite number
of Electoral votes to win the presidency. Id. The election of 1888 marked the third time, when
Grover Cleveland won the popular vote over Benjamin Harrison, with Harrison securing the
Electoral College victory (Grover Cleveland would, of course, go on to win the next election for
his second term). See id. The fourth and fifth times the winner of the Electoral College did not win
the popular vote were in the contested elections of 2000 and 2016, where George W. Bush and
Donald Trump, respectively, secured the presidency. Id.
18. NEALE & NOLAN, supra note 15, at 6.
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 258.
20. KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 259 (“The presidential elector certifying official of each
member state shall certify the appointment in that official’s own state of the elector slate nominated
in that state in association with the national popular vote winner.”).
21. Id. (“This agreement shall take effect when states cumulatively possessing a majority of
the electoral votes have enacted this agreement in substantially the same form and the enactments
by such states have taken effect in each state.”).
22. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE,
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status (last visited Mar. 29, 2021).
23. See Appendix B.
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states thus far, are fairly simple.24 Each state in the NPV would
conduct an ordinary statewide election for President and Vice
President.25 Then, before all Electors meet in their respective states to
cast their votes, the “chief election official” in each member state,
typically the state’s Secretary of State or similar official, must
determine the winner of the popular vote in the state and ultimately
communicate that to the other member states.26 The national popular
vote total encompasses the popular votes of all fifty states and the
District of Columbia, regardless of whether the jurisdiction has
enacted the NPV.27 In the count of Electoral votes by Congress, all of
each member state’s Electoral votes would be allocated to the national
popular vote winner.28 The text of the NPV includes provisions which
apply in cases of a national popular vote tie or where states have an
unequal number of nominated Electors to Electoral votes in the state.29
Lastly, the NPV provides that states may withdraw from the agreement
at any time, but, to protect against strategically timed withdrawals, if
a state withdraws after July 20 of the election year, the withdrawal
does not become effective until after the next president is
inaugurated.30
Proponents of the NPV argue that the plan would solve the most
significant shortcomings of the current Electoral College system of
electing the President and Vice President.31 Specifically, the plan’s
creators and advocates argue that, in addition to reflecting the national
popular vote, adoption of the NPV would make every state relevant to
presidential elections.32 Under the current winner-take-all system for
Electoral votes, presidential candidates are disincentivized from

24. In the fifteen states and the District of Columbia where the NPV has been enacted, the
states have adopted the text of the “Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National
Popular Vote” verbatim. See Appendix B; see, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6921 (Deering 2021). The
NPV Agreement itself requires the member states to enact the Agreement in “substantially the same
form.” KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 259.
25. KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 259.
26. Id. at 259, 263.
27. Id. at 263.
28. Id. at 259.
29. In the event of a national popular vote tie, the Electors of a state would vote for the popular
vote winner in that state. Id. If the number of Electors in a state is less than or greater than the
number of the state’s Electoral votes, the national popular vote winner nominates additional
Electors as needed. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1.
32. Id. at 255.
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campaigning in states in which they will easily win or convincingly
lose.33 Thus, voters in non-“battleground” states are “effectively
disenfranchised.”34 Additionally, NPV creators and advocates claim
the plan would make votes in every state “equal,” solving the current
issue where voters’ votes have disparate importance depending on
where voters are located.35 Voters in small states have a greater ability
to influence Electoral College votes than voters in larger states.36
Enaction of the NPV, according to its proponents, would make every
single state in the United States relevant to the presidential election,
and every vote would count equally.37
Opponents of the NPV believe the plan violates both the text of
the Constitution and the Founders’ intent. Critics argue that the NPV
is unconstitutional on its face in two central ways. First, opponents
argue it violates the Compact Clause of Article I, Section 10, which
forbids states from entering into interstate agreements without
Congress’s consent.38 Critics contend the NPV would be considered a
“compact” requiring congressional approval because it “would
enhance the political power of the member States in a way that
encroaches upon the supremacy of the United States” or “impairs the
sovereign rights of nonmember states.”39 It is quite unlikely that
Congress would approve the plan, as smaller states and swing states
that reap the benefits of the lopsided Electoral College system in
presidential elections would defeat it.40
Second, opponents argue that the NPV is unconstitutional
because it “exceeds the states’ constitutionally delegated authority”
under Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution.41 These critics of
the NPV view that section’s grant of power to the states to appoint
33. Id. at 11.
34. Id. at 12.
35. Id. at 51.
36. Id. at 55.
37. Id. at 53.
38. Norman R. Williams, Why the National Popular Vote Compact is Unconstitutional, 2012
BYU L. REV. 1523, 1539.
39. William G. Ross, Popular Vote Compact: Fraught with Constitutional Perils, JURIST
(Feb. 28, 2012, 1:00 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2012/02/william-ross-votecompact/ (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 472, 477 (1978)).
40. See David Gringer, Note, Why the National Popular Vote Plan Is the Wrong Way to
Abolish the Electoral College, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 222 (2008) (“[The Electoral College’s]
defenders often assert that without the electoral college, small states would ‘have no voting clout
at all.’”).
41. Williams, supra note 38, at 1583.
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their presidential Electors as limited in scope to that power alone.42
They conclude that because the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly
grant states the power to select Electors based on the national popular
vote, and states’ Electors have not historically voted in accordance
with the national popular vote, the state power to appoint is a mere
formality.43
Moreover, opponents believe the NPV is contrary to the Framers’
intent in creating the Electoral College and thus a non-majoritarian
democracy.44 The Framers “expressly rejected” popular election of the
President in order to protect smaller states’ interests.45 Because the
Framers viewed the presidential Electors as “guardians possessing
great wisdom, exhibiting superior character, and exercising
independent judgment,” opponents of the NPV view the plan as
directly antithetical to the Framers’ intentions when the Electoral
College was established.46
The NPV would likely survive both constitutional challenges,
though. The Compact Clause would not prove a tough hurdle to
surmount. The Supreme Court has held that some types of interstate
agreements do not qualify as “compacts” requiring congressional
approval.47 Under the precedent established in U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Commission,48 the NPV would not be considered an
interstate agreement qualifying as a “compact” requiring
congressional approval because the NPV member states are not
“collectively creating a new power that they [do] not already have
individually.”49 The agreement only implicates an area where the
federal government has an interest, but not exclusive power, given that
the U.S. Constitution allows for states to choose Electors however they
choose.50 Thus, the NPV does not require congressional approval, nor
42. Id. at 1573–74 (“[T]he states’ power to regulate the manner of presidential elections is far
more limited than the proponents of the [National Popular Vote Plan] contend. . . . That the states
generally have the power to choose the manner in which their electors are selected begins the
constitutional analysis; it does not end it.”).
43. Id. at 1532, 1573–81.
44. Id. at 1577.
45. Id. at 1528; NEALE & NOLAN, supra note 15, at 18–19.
46. See Williams, supra note 38, at 1559.
47. Id. at 1539.
48. 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
49. Michael Brody, Circumventing the Electoral College: Why the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact Survives Constitutional Scrutiny Under the Compact Clause, 5 LEGIS. & POL’Y
BRIEF 33, 45 (2013).
50. Id. at 45–46.
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does it exceed the states’ authority under the U.S. Constitution, as
opponents argue.51
Assuming constitutionality, in order for the NPV to work, states
must be able to effectively ensure that Electors will actually vote for
the winner of the national popular vote. The extensive arguments for
and against the NPV mirror and complement the arguments for and
against binding Electors. Both proponents of the NPV and states with
Elector-binding statutes seize on the language in Article II, Section 1
that states have the power to appoint Electors in any manner as
justification. On the other hand, opponents of the NPV, often
proponents of discretion of Electors to vote faithlessly, believe that
appointment power is not unlimited.
B. The Electoral College
1. Constitutional Provisions
The U.S. Constitution does not describe the Electoral College or
the states’ roles in the presidential election system in much detail.
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 gives states the mandate and the power
to appoint Electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct,” so long as the Electors appointed are not Senators or
Representatives and do not hold an “Office of Trust or Profit under the
United States.”52 Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 then details the
procedures for Elector voting and for counting the Elector votes in the
U.S. Senate.53 Additionally, the Twelfth Amendment directs Electors
to vote separately for the President and Vice President.54 The U.S.
Constitution gives no further indication as to how the Electors should
be appointed, how the Electors must vote, or what happens if the
Electors vote a certain way.
2. Faithless Electors
The lack of constitutional clarity regarding the Electoral College
has led to state discretion in the allocation of Electoral votes. In all
states, state election laws require that the political parties each choose
51. The constitutionality of the NPV is beyond the scope of this Note. For additional
information regarding constitutional arguments on both sides, see Brody, supra note 49, and
Williams, supra note 38.
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
53. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.

(11) 54.4_LABRECQUE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

PATH TO A POPULAR VOTE

11/18/21 12:42 PM

1307

a slate of potential Electors prior to the general election.55 These
Electors are individuals chosen for their loyalty or service to the
political parties, or the individuals have some connection to the party’s
candidate.56 However, states differ in their methods for allocating
Electoral votes after the general election. Forty-eight states and the
District of Columbia have enacted winner-take-all systems for
awarding their Electoral votes to ensure states maximized their
influence in selecting a president.57 Under the winner-take-all
approach, all of a state’s Electoral votes are allocated to the winner of
the popular vote in that state.58 Thus, only the Electors from the
political party whose candidate wins the state’s popular vote cast their
vote.59
On the other hand, the remaining two states, Maine and Nebraska,
allocate their Electoral votes through a district system.60 In these
states, two Electors at large cast their votes for the presidential
candidate who wins the statewide popular vote, while Electors of each
congressional district cast their votes for the candidates who win such
districts.61 Like in winner-take-all systems, in Maine and Nebraska,
the political parties select a slate of Electors at their conventions, and
Electors of the parties who win each district and the state popular vote
cast their electoral votes.62 Under the district system, then,
theoretically Electors from both political parties could cast their votes,
compared to the winner-take-all system where only one party’s
Electors cast ballots. In both the winner-take-all system and the district
system, though, so-called “faithless Electors” who vote for a candidate

55. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.30.020 (2021) (“Each political party shall select a number
of candidates for electors of President and Vice-President of the United States equal to the number
of senators and representatives to which the state is entitled in Congress. The candidates for electors
shall be selected by the state party convention or in any other manner prescribed by the bylaws of
the party.”).
56. About the Electors, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/electoralcollege/electors (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
57. Craig J. Herbst, Note, Redrawing the Electoral Map: Reforming the Electoral College with
the District-Popular Plan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 230 (2012); The Electoral College, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/the-electoral-college.aspx.
58. Herbst, supra note 57, at 230.
59. The Electoral College, supra note 57.
60. Id.
61. ME. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 805(2) (2020); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2) (2021).
62. ME. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 321; NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-710.
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other than the party’s nominee undermine the states’ ability to control
the allocation of their electoral votes.63
a. History and the Occurrence of Faithless Electors in Close
Elections
Historically and customarily, most Electors vote for their party’s
candidate if that candidate wins the state's popular vote.64 However,
according to FairVote.org, a nonprofit that advocates for a national
popular vote election, 165 faithless electoral votes for a presidential or
vice-presidential candidate other than the Elector’s party candidate
have been cast in U.S. history.65 Of course, in some cases, these votes
were faithless not out of a desire to be rebellious but for practical
reasons.66 For example, when party candidates died in the past,
Electors were forced to change their vote before the Electoral College
convened.67 Since 1900, only sixteen true faithless votes were cast,
and these faithless votes have largely been symbolic.68 Though
faithless votes have not yet determined any presidential elections, the
problem of the faithless Elector lurks, with the possibility of a
constitutional crisis in polarized and close elections like those in 2000
and 2016.69 Indeed, in 2016, the Electoral College saw the largest
number of faithless votes in U.S. history amid the highly contentious
election of Donald Trump.70 A scenario in which a state’s slate of
Electors votes for someone other than that state’s popular vote winner,
possibly becoming the 270th of the requisite 270 electoral votes
needed to win the presidency, has the potential to completely
undermine voter faith in the election system.71

63. Alexander Gouzoules, The “Faithless Elector” and 2016: Constitutional Uncertainty
After the Election of Donald Trump, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 215, 215–16 (2017).
64. Id.
65. Faithless Electors, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_electors (last updated
July 6, 2020); Nina Agrawal, All the Times in U.S. History that Members of the Electoral College
Voted Their Own Way, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/lana-faithless-electors-2016-story.html.
66. See Faithless Electors, supra note 65.
67. Id.
68. Agrawal, supra note 65.
69. See Bennett, supra note 6, at 124.
70. Drew Penrose, Faithless Electors Fizzle, but Leave Uncertainty, FAIRVOTE (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_electors_fizzle.
71. See Bennett, supra note 6, at 123.
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b. Faithless Electors Would Undermine the NPV
The occurrence of faithless Electors also has the potential to
disrupt the NPV if the plan were enacted in a sufficient number of
states. The NPV does not eliminate the Electoral College, so it does
not eliminate the possibility of faithless Electors.72 The plan simply
requires that, instead of voting for the winner of the popular vote in
the state when the Electors convene (or, in Maine and Nebraska, the
winner of the popular vote in the state and the districts), Electors must
vote for the national popular vote winner.73 In fact, the text of the NPV
bill itself is similar to how most states currently appoint Electors,
appointing the “Elector slate nominated in that state in association
with the national popular vote winner.”74 While Electors would be
associated with the national popular vote winner, association with a
particular candidate has not prevented faithless votes in the past,
particularly in the 2016 election.75 The NPV could present a scenario
in which an Elector is unhappy with a particular candidate winning the
national popular vote, even if that candidate is from their political
party, and thus cast a faithless vote. By itself, the NPV does not solve
the faithless Elector problem and could potentially exacerbate it.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ELECTOR-BINDING STATUTES AND
PENALTIES
The Supreme Court has examined the states’ power in relation to
presidential Electors a few times. The Court first explored the states’
power of Elector appointment in McPherson v. Blacker in 1892.76 The
Supreme Court next considered whether statutes that conditioned
Elector appointment on support for the party’s primary candidate were
constitutional in the 1952 case, Ray v. Blair.77 Most recently, a split in
lower courts on whether similar state statutes to those in Ray, but
which included enforcement mechanisms in addition to simple Elector
promises, led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chiafalo v.
Washington.78

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 258
Id. at 264.
Id.
Penrose, supra note 70.
146 U.S. 1 (1892).
343 U.S. 214 (1952).
140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
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A. McPherson v. Blacker
Following the 1888 presidential election in which Grover
Cleveland won the popular vote but lost in the Electoral College,
Michigan, run by a Democratic legislature, sought to secure a
Democratic victory for Cleveland.79 Thus, Michigan enacted a statute
changing the state from a winner-take-all state to a district system for
the 1892 election.80 Several nominees for Elector, including William
McPherson, Jr., filed suit against the Michigan Secretary of State,
Robert R. Blacker, seeking to have the statute declared
unconstitutional.81 The Electors argued the statute was in conflict with
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, largely
reasoning that because that section states that “each State shall
appoint” its Electors, each individual state must act as one unit.82 Thus,
the Electors argued, dividing up the state’s electoral votes by district
would not be appointment of Electors by the state.83
In its first decision addressing the states’ power of appointment
of Electors, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
Michigan statute.84 The Court rejected the Electors’ argument in the
case, explaining that the act of appointment, regardless of whether the
state is a winner-take-all or district system, is an act of the state as a
whole.85 Most notably, the Court said that the “practical construction”
of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution “has
conceded plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the
appointment of electors,” and the “appointment and mode of
appointment of electors belong exclusively to the States.”86 Though
the Court concluded this in the context of the state enacting a district
system by statute, which other states had similarly legislated at various
times up until 1892, the Court’s expansive language suggests that the
states’ appointment power is absolute.
79. Paul Egan, Democrats Once Pulled the Same Electoral College Stunt, DET. FREE PRESS
(Nov. 21, 2014, 3:57 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2014/11/20/michiganwhite-house-presidential-election-electoral-college/70028908/.
80. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 1. The statute was repealed, and Michigan returned to a winnertake-all state following the 1892 election, when Republicans gained legislative and executive
control in Michigan. Egan, supra note 79.
81. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 2.
82. Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2).
83. Id. at 11.
84. Id. at 4–6.
85. Id. at 25–26.
86. Id. at 35.
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B. Ray v. Blair
In Ray v. Blair, an Alabama statute required that candidates for
Elector promise to support the winner of the Democratic Party’s
primary in the general election.87 One candidate for Elector in the
Party, Edmund Blair, refused to take this pledge, and as a result, the
chairman of the Executive Committee for the Alabama Democratic
Party did not certify Blair as an Elector.88 The Alabama Supreme
Court held that the pledge violated the Twelfth Amendment because
Electors are “constitutional officer[s],” mandated to use their own
discretion in exercising their duties.89
The Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court,
holding that “[n]either the language of Art. II, § 1, nor that of the
Twelfth Amendment forbids a party to require from candidates in its
primary a pledge of political conformity with the aims of the party.”90
In its opinion, the Court acknowledged the challenges inherent in
Elector-binding statutes, where Electors perform a federal function,
but are actually state-appointed.91 The Court addressed the argument
that the Founders intended for Electors to exercise their own judgment,
and therefore a promise to vote a certain way interferes with their
“constitutional duty.”92 The Court found, though, that a pledge to
support a party's nominee is a “method of securing party candidates”
and a proper exercise of a state’s right to appoint Electors in whatever
manner the state chooses.93 Additionally, the Court held that the
Twelfth Amendment, though it establishes that Electors must vote by
ballot, implying some choice, does not bar an Elector pledging their
choice before the election.94 The Court found there was a long history
of an “implied or oral pledge” for a candidate.95 Lastly, the Court
noted that its decision is applicable only to promises to vote a certain
way at the primary election stage and may differ in the general election

87. 343 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1952).
88. Id. at 215.
89. Opinion of the Justices, 34 So. 2d 598, 600 (Ala. 1948); see Ray v. Blair, 57 So. 2d 395,
398 (Ala. 1952).
90. Ray, 343 U.S. at 225.
91. Id. at 224.
92. Id. at 225.
93. Id. at 227.
94. Id. at 228.
95. Id. at 228–29.
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because of “assumed constitutional freedom of the elector under the
Constitution.”96
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson argued that the original
intent of the framers in creating the Electoral College was for Electors
to be “free agents,” using their “independent and nonpartisan
judgment.”97 Though advocating for the abolition of the Electoral
College because it is a “mystifying and distorting factor in presidential
elections,” Justice Jackson remarked that even if voting for a candidate
to whom an Elector promised their vote is a normal practice, custom
is not sufficient to amend the U.S. Constitution.98 Finally, Justice
Jackson described the requirement that Electors promise to vote in
such a way as “effect[ing] a complete suppression of competition
between different views within the party.”99
C. Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado Department of State v.
Baca
In 2020, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases that
resulted in a lower court split, Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado
Department of State v. Baca.100 In the wake of the 2016 election, both
Democratic and Republican Party Electors across the country
endeavored to prevent Donald Trump from entering the White
House.101 These Electors dubbed themselves the “Hamilton Electors,”
per Federalist Paper No. 68, in which Alexander Hamilton discussed
the necessity of the Electoral College.102 Hamilton wrote that “[i]t was
desirable” that the “men most capable” of selecting the President do
so, in order to ensure that “the office of President will never fall to the
lot of any man who is not . . . endowed with the requisite
qualifications.”103 The Hamilton Electors hoped to unify enough
Democratic and Republican Electors to either elect a moderate
Republican “compromise candidate,” like Mitt Romney or John
Kasich, or to at least divert enough Electoral votes to prevent Donald
96. Id. at 230.
97. Id. at 232 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 233–34.
99. Id. at 235.
100. 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
101. Lilly O’Donnell, Meet the ‘Hamilton Electors’ Hoping for an Electoral College Revolt,
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/meet-thehamilton-electors-hoping-for-an-electoral-college-revolt/508433/.
102. Id.
103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Trump from reaching 270.104 Both Chiafalo and Baca involved these
Hamilton Electors.105
1. Facts of the Cases
Chiafalo involved the constitutionality of Washington’s Electorbinding statute.106 Washington’s statute included a penalty for
faithless votes.107 Its Elector-binding statute held that “[a]ny elector
who votes for a person or persons not nominated by the party of which
he or she is an elector is subject to a civil penalty of up to one thousand
dollars.”108 Plaintiffs were Washington Democratic Party Electors,
called upon to vote for the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, after
she won the popular vote in Washington.109 The Washington Electors
instead voted for Colin Powell as part of the Hamilton Electors
movement.110
In accordance with Washington’s penalty statute, the Washington
Secretary of State fined the plaintiffs $1,000 each for violating their
agreement to vote for the party nominee.111 The plaintiffs challenged
this fine in the superior court, which upheld the fine as
constitutional.112 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court, holding that the Constitution does not grant to Electors the
discretion to vote unencumbered by any state restrictions.113 The court
recognized the federal function that Electors perform, but reasoned
that the Constitution “explicitly confers broad authority on the states”
to determine the procedures by which Electors are appointed and
conduct their federal function, citing both Ray v. Blair and McPherson
v. Blacker.114 Subsequently, Washington’s statute was repealed and
replaced with a statute calling for a Washington Elector who fails to

104. O’Donnell, supra note 101.
105. Id.
106. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2322 (2020).
107. WASH. REV. CODE §29A.56.340 (2016) (amended 2019).
108. Id.
109. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322.
110. O’Donnell, supra note 101; In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 2019), aff’d sub nom.
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). The plaintiffs also voted for a different vice
president than vice presidential nominee, Tim Kaine. In re Guerra, 441 P.3d at 808.
111. In re Guerra, 441 P.3d at 808.
112. Id. at 809.
113. Id. at 817.
114. Id. at 814.

(11) 54.4_LABRECQUE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1314

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

11/18/21 12:42 PM

[Vol. 54:1299

vote for the party’s candidate to be removed and replaced with an
Elector who will vote for the party candidate.115
Similarly, Baca involved Colorado’s Elector-binding statute.116
Like Washington’s statute, Colorado’s provides that Electors shall
vote for the candidate who wins the popular vote in that state, yet it
fails to articulate any consequence or penalty for voting contrarily.117
In Baca, Micheal Baca, an Elector for the Democratic Party in
Colorado, cast his vote for John Kasich instead of Hillary Clinton in
violation of the statute and after the Colorado Secretary of State had
warned that violation of the oath may subject an Elector to perjury
charges.118 Following Baca’s vote for Kasich, the Secretary of State
removed Baca as an Elector, nullified his vote, replaced him with an
Elector who voted for Clinton, and referred him to the Colorado
Attorney General for criminal prosecution.119 Baca then sued, alleging
a violation of his Article II and Twelfth Amendment rights.120 The
Tenth Circuit preliminarily tackled the issue of whether Baca lacked
standing to sue and determined that Baca had standing “based on his
removal from his role of Elector and the cancellation of his vote.”121
Additionally, the court discussed mootness, but found that the case
was not moot because ruling on the issues will have an effect on the
world and on Baca because he can receive nominal damages.122
Unlike the Washington Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit
ultimately found that Electors are free to exercise discretion in voting
for whomever they choose.123 Its reasoning consistently emphasized
that because there is no state removal power expressed in the
Constitution, states cannot remove Electors.124 The court’s conclusion
echoed its interpretation of the framers’ intent that “enlightened and

115. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 29A.56.084, .090 (2020).
116. Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 901 (10th Cir. 2019).
117. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-304(5) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 7 of the 1st Reg. Sess.
of the 73rd Gen. Assemb. (2021)).
118. Baca, 935 F.3d at 904.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 922. The standing issue presented in Baca is beyond the scope of this Note and will
not be discussed further.
122. Id. at 928. Similarly, the mootness issue presented in Baca is beyond the scope of this Note
and will not be discussed further.
123. Id. at 955–56.
124. See id. at 943.
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respectable Electors” would be free to vote in their discretion to select
the best candidate as President.125
2. Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court considered both Baca and Chiafalo together
in its Chiafalo opinion.126 The Court held that states can unequivocally
enforce Elector-binding statutes “for reasons much like those given in
Ray.”127 The Court primarily surveyed the text of the U.S.
Constitution.128 Given the U.S. Constitution’s sparse description of the
Electoral College, the Court, mirroring the states’ arguments in both
cases, found that the text of the U.S. Constitution does not prevent
states from imposing penalties to prevent faithless Electors.129
Additionally, based on the language in Article II, Section 1, Clause 2
that states may appoint Electors however they choose, the Court
concluded that states’ appointment power necessarily includes the
ability to place conditions on appointment.130 An enforcement
mechanism in the Elector-binding law is one such way to condition an
Elector’s appointment.131 The Court also refuted the Electors’
argument that words like “ballot” and “vote” present in Article II,
Section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment necessitate that Electors
possess discretion.132 Citing the historical precedent that most Electors
have felt bound to reflect the voters’ preferences with their votes, the
Court stated that “voting is still voting when discretion departs.”133
In its analysis of the history of the Electoral College, the Court
examined “long settled and established practice.”134 Particularly as
political parties became engrained in American politics and the
Twelfth Amendment was enacted, the “practice that had arisen in the
Nation’s first elections” of Electors faithfully voting for their
appointers’ preferred candidate was solidified.135 Washington and
125. Id. at 954.
126. See Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2316 (2020); Chiafalo v. Washington,
140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323 (2020).
127. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323.
128. Id. at 2324.
129. Id. at 2324–25.
130. Id. at 2324.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2325.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2326.
135. Id. at 2327.
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Colorado’s laws, along with all thirty-two other state Elector-binding
statutes, “reflect[] a tradition more than two centuries old.”136 Finally,
the Court highlighted that in U.S. history, the percentage of faithless
votes that have been cast, excluding those cast when a party nominee
has died, reflect only one half of one percent of the total Electoral
votes cast.137 Thus, “neither text nor history” support the Electors’
arguments that they are able to cast faithless votes unfettered by state
restrictions.138
In a concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that the states do not
derive power to bind Electors from the appointment power in Article
II, but rather from the Tenth Amendment, which holds that powers not
delegated or prohibited in the U.S. Constitution are reserved to the
states.139
III. STATES’ AUTHORITY TO APPOINT AND BIND ELECTORS
A. Statutes
After the Supreme Court upheld the Alabama Elector-binding
statute in Ray v. Blair, more states adopted similar Elector-binding
laws.140 States want to control the allocation of their Electoral votes
and maintain the status quo where Electors vote for the winner of the
popular vote in their state.141 To that end, thirty-three states and the
District of Columbia have enacted laws attempting to bind their
Electors to vote for their party’s candidate after that candidate wins
the popular vote in the state.142 Because the Supreme Court did not
give states guidance on drafting these Elector-binding statutes, the
statutes vary wildly between states in language, procedures, and
penalties.143
Scholars have previously categorized the Elector-binding statutes
based on the statutes’ construction and outcomes.144 John Zadrozny,

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 2328.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2329–35 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952); Gouzoules, supra note 63, at 223.
See Gouzoules, supra note 63, at 215.
See Appendix A.
Gouzoules, supra note 63, at 223.
Id. at 223–24.

(11) 54.4_LABRECQUE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

PATH TO A POPULAR VOTE

11/18/21 12:42 PM

1317

for example, classified the state statutes into three distinct types.145
The first type of statutes, according to Zadrozny, are “simple statutory
declaration[s]” that Electors must vote according to the election
results.146 The second type are state statutes that require Electors to
take actual pledges that they will vote with their respective parties.147
Lastly, under Zadrozny’s classification, the third type mandate that a
faithless vote triggers resignation of the Elector and appointment of a
new Elector who would vote faithfully.148 Zadrozny’s characterization
of the statutes does not account for other types of penalties like fines
or criminal action.149
Additionally, Alexander Gouzoules, critiquing Zadrozny’s
approach, divided the Elector-binding statutes into different
categories.150 Gouzoules’s “more precise framework” uses two
categories: deterrent-based statutes and invalidation-based statutes.151
Under Gouzoules’s structure, state statutes that require a mere
statutory declaration, those that require Electors to certify they will
vote for a certain candidate, and those that impose penalties other than
removal and replacement of the Elector are deterrent-based statutes.152
On the other hand, invalidation-based statutes are those that require
the removal and replacement of faithless Electors.153
This Note provides a new and useful taxonomy of Elector-binding
statutes that instead organizes the statutes in terms of their
enforcement mechanisms. This enforcement-based approach was
developed following the Supreme Court’s decision in Chiafalo due to
that decision’s focus on whether and by what means states can enforce
these statutes.154 Additionally, this approach combines Zadrozny’s
and Gouzoules’s approaches into a more specific organization. Like
Zadrozny’s organization, this approach divides the statutes into three
categories. However, Zadrozny’s taxonomy separates simple statutory
declarations and pledges, when both have the same result in terms of
145. John A. Zadrozny, Comment, The Myth of Discretion: Why Presidential Electors Do Not
Receive First Amendment Protection, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 165, 179 (2003).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Gouzoules, supra note 63, at 224.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 226.
154. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020).
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enforcement, as explained below. Zadrozny’s grouping also does not
take into account penalties apart from removal and replacement, which
are notable in light of Chiafalo. Moreover, while Gouzoules’s
framework is closer to an enforcement-based approach, the term
“deterrent-based” is imprecise, as removal and replacement statutes
can also deter Electors.
Thus, under this Note’s classification, state statutes can be
characterized as either:
(1) “Honor System” statutes—the statute either contains a
declaration that the Elector must vote for the party’s candidate or
requires the Elector to take a pledge, but there is no explicit penalty
for voting for someone other than the popular-vote-winning
candidate;155
(2) “Replacement” statutes—the statute requires that if the
Elector fails to vote for the party’s candidate, the Elector will be
removed and replaced with an Elector who will vote for the party
candidate;156 and
(3) “Penalty” statutes—the statute holds that voting for someone
other than the party’s candidate results in some penalty, like a
monetary fine.157
Appendix A following this Note contains tables that group the
statutes according to their categories.158
1. Honor System
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia have adopted
Honor System statutes that do not impose replacement, nor any
penalty.159 This Honor System category encompasses both simple
statutory declarations and state-mandated pledges, as both types of
statutes do not contain enforcement mechanisms in their language.
Delaware provides an example of a simple statutory declaration,
stating that Electors “shall be required to cast their individual votes for
the presidential and vice presidential nominees, or their legal

155. See Appendix A, Table 1.
156. See Appendix A, Table 2.
157. See Appendix A, Table 3.
158. Appendix A.
159. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Appendix A, Table 1.
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successors, of the political party that nominated the elector.”160 Other
states require Electors to take an actual pledge.161 Oregon’s statute, for
example, mandates that, when selected by their political party,
Electors must “sign a pledge that, if elected, the candidate will vote in
the electoral college for the candidates of the party for President and
Vice President.”162
Additionally, the Honor System category includes Maine, which
does not have statutorily-prescribed penalties or consequences for
faithless voting.163 However, in the 2016 election, an Elector voted for
Bernie Sanders instead of the state’s popular vote winner, Hillary
Clinton, in his first ballot, which was invalidated.164 The Elector’s vote
for Sanders triggered a second vote, when he changed his vote to
Clinton.165 Thus, on paper Maine is an Honor System state, but in
practice, the state may utilize a rejected ballot type of enforcement.
The Honor System category, however, does not include Colorado.
On paper, Colorado looks like an Honor System statute, holding that
“[e]ach presidential elector shall vote for the presidential candidate
and, by separate ballot, vice-presidential candidate who received the
highest number of votes at the preceding general election in this
state.”166 As explained above in the description for Baca, in the 2016
election, an Elector voted for John Kasich instead of Hillary Clinton,
and the Elector was removed from his position and replaced.167
Despite no statutory replacement mechanism or penalty in Colorado,
the state enforced by replacement. Thus, Colorado is categorized as a
Replacement state.

160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4303(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of the 151st Gen.
Assemb. (2021–2022)).
161. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 248.355(2) (West, Westlaw through laws enacted in the
2021 Reg. Sess. of the 81st Leg. Assemb.).
162. Id.
163. See ME. STAT. tit. 21, § 805(2) (2020).
164. Rebecca Savransky, Maine Elector Switches Sanders Vote to Clinton, THE HILL (Dec. 19,
2016, 11:20 AM) https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/311017-maine-elector-switchessanders-vote-to-clinton.
165. Id.
166. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-304 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 7 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of
the 73rd Gen. Assemb. (2021)).
167. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 901 (10th Cir. 2019); see supra Section
II.C.
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2. Replacement
Eleven states require that Electors vote for their party’s candidate,
or else they will be removed from office and replaced with an Elector
who will vote for the party candidate.168 Six of the Replacement states
have adopted this penalty as part of the Uniform Faithful Presidential
Electors Act (UFPEA).169 Drafted by the Uniform Law Commission,
the UFPEA provides language states can adopt, which includes a
standard pledge and the remedy of replacement if an Elector votes
contrary to the pledge.170 The Uniform Law Commission expresses
that violation of the pledge “effectively constitute[es] resignation from
the office of elector.”171 Nebraska’s adoption of the UFPEA, for
example, contains a standard pledge in one section of the statute,
slightly tweaked to reflect Nebraska’s district Electoral system, as well
as the standard UFPEA remedy in the following section.172 The
remedy section states that a “presidential elector who . . . attempts to
present a ballot marked in violation of his or her pledge vacates the
office of presidential Elector.”173 Though only six states have enacted
this uniform statutory language, the five other Removal and
Replacement states use similar language in their statutory
construction.174 Iowa, for example, uses almost identical language,
stating that an Elector who casts a faithless vote vacates the office of
Elector.175
Some states in this Replacement category first cancel a faithless
vote that has been cast.176 Arizona provides an example of a state that
first cancels the faithless vote, then removes and replaces the
Elector.177 Under Arizona’s statute, if an Elector “knowingly refuses”
168. These states are: Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, and Washington. See Appendix A, Table 2.
169. These states are: Indiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Montana, and Washington. See
Appendix A, Table 2. Washington only enacted the UFPEA in July of 2019 after the decision in In
re Guerra. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.090(3) (2020).
170. Faithful Presidential Electors Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org
/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=6b56b4c1-5004-48a5-add2-0c410cce587d (last
visited Apr. 11, 2021).
171. Id.
172. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 32-713(2), 32-714 (2021).
173. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-714 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2d Reg. Sess. of
the 106th Leg. (2020)).
174. See Appendix A, Table 2.
175. IOWA CODE § 54.8(3) (2021).
176. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 16-212 (2021).
177. See id.
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to cast their vote for the winner of Arizona’s popular vote, the Elector
is “no longer eligible” to serve as a presidential Elector, and the
Elector is replaced with someone who casts the vote.178
3. Penalty
The third category, Penalty statutes, is comprised of the
remaining five states with Elector-binding laws.179 These statutes
require Electors to vote for the party candidate and impose some sort
of penalty, either in addition to or instead of replacement.180 For
example, up until Washington adopted the UFPEA in 2019, the state
previously imposed a $1,000 fine on Electors who voted for someone
other than the popular vote winner.181 North Carolina’s current statute,
on the other hand, requires an Elector who fails to vote for the party
candidate to pay $500, vacate the office of Elector, and the Elector’s
vote is nullified.182 Oklahoma, similarly, imposes a $1,000 fine in
addition to replacement.183
Some Penalty states threaten criminal action if a faithless vote is
cast. California’s statute either imposes a $1,000 fine, imprisonment
for anywhere from sixteen months to three years, or both a fine and
imprisonment, if someone “knowingly or fraudulently acts in
contravention” of the statute requiring Electors to cast their vote for
the party candidate.184 New Mexico makes voting for someone other
than the party candidate a fourth-degree felony, which comes with up
to eighteen months in prison and/or a fine of up to $5,000.185 Finally,
South Carolina requires that prospective Electors declare who they
will vote for if elected, and if they ultimately do not vote for that
candidate, they will be “punished according to law” for violating
election law.186

178. Id.
179. These states are California, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.
See Appendix A, Table 3.
180. See Appendix A, Table 3.
181. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 807–08 (Wash. 2019), aff’d sub nom. Chiafalo v.
Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
182. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-212 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2020 Reg. Sess.
of the Gen. Assemb.).
183. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 10-102, 10-109 (2021).
184. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18002 (Deering 2021).
185. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-9 (West, Westlaw through emergency legislation through Ch. 3
of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 55th Leg. (2021)); id. § 31-18-15.
186. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-80 (2020).
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B. Political Party/Candidate Vetting
Instead of enacting statutes to bind Electors, another possible
option for ensuring Electors do not vote faithlessly is for political
parties in the various states to vet the Elector candidates more
intensely to ensure the Elector will remain faithful.187 Ideally, the
parties would pick people who are more loyal both to the parties and
to the candidates.
As the National Popular Vote organization explains, the current
system in states without Elector-binding statutes relies on political
parties vetting and selecting their Electors carefully.188 Though the
National Popular Vote movement claims that this system of vetting
Electors has worked reliably in the past and in the states that do not
have Elector-binding laws, the rise in faithless Elector votes suggests
otherwise.189 In 2016, of the ten Electors who cast faithless votes, two
of them were from Texas, where there is no Elector-binding law.190
On the other hand, Pennsylvania enacted a statute that requires the
presidential candidates themselves to choose the party’s Elector
slate.191 After being nominated by a political party, the presidential
candidate then nominates “as many persons to be the candidates of his
party for the office of presidential elector as the State is then entitled
to.”192 No faithless votes were cast by Pennsylvania Electors in
2016.193 This is, to be sure, a very small sample size, but it reflects the
concern that political party vetting absent a statute may not be the most
reliable solution, while Electors nominated by presidential candidates
may be more effective.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE NPV AND STATES
During the Chiafalo oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts asked
the attorney for the Electors, “assuming [the NPV] gathers enough
support and becomes law, there’d be no way to enforce it [without

187. Supreme Court Unanimously Rules that States May Require Presidential Electors to be
Faithful, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/faithless-elector-issuedoes-not-affect-operation-national-popular-vote (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Faithless Electors, supra note 65.
191. 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2878 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. Act
1).
192. Id.
193. Faithless Electors, supra note 65.
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Elector-binding laws]?”194 Lawrence Lessig, attorney for the Electors
in Chiafalo, responded to Justice Roberts’ question by stating that “if
there's a national popular vote compact, the number of electors for the
winner would be so significant, it would be very hard to imagine any
discretion affecting the ultimate result.”195 However, if only enough
states join the NPV to secure the required 270 electoral votes to win
the presidency, even one faithless vote from a state in the NPV could
change the election. Of course, it is conceivable and potentially likely
that more states than only the exact number required to get to 270 votes
would join the NPV. Furthermore, there may be more states than just
those in the NPV whose electoral votes end up directed to the national
popular vote winner. However, states should not wait and see whether
Electors in their state will vote faithlessly. States can take advantage
of the Chiafalo decision to enforce their Elector-binding statute in any
way they see fit.
The Supreme Court’s decision has implications for the NPV, for
states, and for political parties. Two major questions remain following
the Chiafalo opinion: (1) What is the best way for states to enforce
Elector votes to ensure the NPV can work effectively? and (2) Can and
should political parties be cut out of the Elector-appointment process,
particularly under the NPV?
A. Enforcement of Electors’ Votes
The Supreme Court’s holding in Chiafalo that states can enforce
Elector-binding statutes did not place any restrictions on the
enforcement mechanisms that states may use.196 In fact, the case
considered both the imposition of a fine on an Elector and the removal
and replacement of an Elector, finding both enforcement mechanisms
constitutional.197 Therefore, any of the three categories of Electorbinding statutes—Honor System, Replacement, or Penalty—are
constitutionally acceptable forms of Elector-binding statutes.198
The states, and particularly states that have enacted the NPV,
must determine the best way to ensure their Electors vote with the will
of the people. As of the writing of this Note, twelve of the sixteen
194. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4:56, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (No.
19-465).
195. Id. at 5:02.
196. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2318.
197. See id.
198. See id.
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states that have enacted the NPV also have Elector-binding laws.199
The remaining four states that have enacted the NPV must also enact
either Replacement or Penalty Elector-binding laws to prevent their
Electors from invalidating the NPV completely.200 The NPV’s
effectiveness in implementing a national popular vote election
depends on Electors faithfully voting for the national popular vote
winner.
With the implications of the Chiafalo decision in mind, the
Replacement statutes and Penalty statutes are the most effective
solutions states can implement to ensure faithful Electors. First, Honor
System statutes, which lack any enforcement mechanism, would not
guarantee that the NPV would be effective. While Alexander
Gouzoules categorizes these statutes as “deterrent-based,” there is no
statutory or practical indication that these statutes actually deter
Electors.201 Without a consequence for breaking the promise or
pledge, or a penalty imposed, Electors would not be effectively
deterred from voting for someone who does not win the national
popular vote. A clear example of the lack of effectiveness of Honor
System statutes can be seen in one of the faithless votes cast in the
2016 presidential election. When the Electors convened to vote
following the election, David Mulinix, an Elector from Hawaii, cast
his vote for Bernie Sanders instead of Hillary Clinton because he
purportedly believed the Electoral College is “outdated.”202 Hawaii’s
Honor System statute simply states that the Electors “shall vote . . . for
that person for president and that person for vice president of the
United States, who are, respectively, the candidates of the political
party or group which they represent.”203 Clearly, Mulinix was not
deterred in any way from voting for someone other than Clinton, nor
was he removed from his position of Elector or penalized in some
other way. There is nothing in Honor System statutes that prevents
Electors from voting for the popular vote winner, and these statutes
cannot so simply be described as “deterrent-based.”
199. See Appendix A; Appendix B.
200. The states that have enacted the NPV but do not have elector binding laws are Illinois,
New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. See Appendix A; Appendix B.
201. Gouzoules, supra note 63, at 224–25.
202. Julia Boccagno, Which Candidates Did the Seven “Faithless” Electors Support?, CBS
NEWS (Dec. 21, 2016, 12:13 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/which-candidates-did-theseven-faithless-electors-support-election-2016/.
203. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14-28 (2020).
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Weakness of Honor System statutes can also be seen in two other
instances following the 2016 election. As discussed above, in Maine
and Colorado, the states instituted enforcement of Electors’ faithless
votes that were not statutorily-prescribed. In Maine, the Elector’s
faithless vote triggered a second vote, in which the Elector voted
faithfully.204 In Colorado, the Elector’s faithless vote resulted in the
Elector’s replacement.205 If Honor System statutes are not just that, an
honor system, then states ought to convert these statutes into Penalty
or Replacement statutes, which do have spelled-out enforcement
mechanisms. The workability of the NPV necessitates that state
Elector-binding statutes carry some sort of consequence or penalty.
Next, Penalty statutes are certainly better than Honor System
statutes and may allow the NPV to work properly. However, the
penalty would likely need to be significant for it to be effective, or
possibly combined with another outcome like removal and
replacement. Notably, the faithless Electors in Chiafalo were faced
with a $1,000 fine and chose to vote in violation of the statute,
nonetheless.206 If $1,000 is not enough, North Carolina’s $500 fine,
for example, probably would not be enough by itself.207 North
Carolina, though, removes and replaces the Elector in addition to the
fine, which might be the most effective way to deter faithless votes.208
Additionally, states could follow in New Mexico’s footsteps and make
voting in violation of the statute a felony, which is more likely to be
effective at deterring faithless votes than fines.209 It is unlikely that
presidential Electors, many of them prominent members of their
political party, would want to risk criminal action by voting
faithlessly. Because Penalty statutes may be less of a deterrent for an
Elector trying to make a statement or simply not caring about paying
a fine in the event of a faithless vote, Replacement statutes may be the
best option to ensure the effectiveness of the NPV.

204. See Savransky, supra note 164.
205. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 901 (10th Cir. 2019).
206. In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 2019), aff’d sub nom. Chiafalo v. Washington,
140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
207. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-212 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2020 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb., subject to changes made pursuant to direction of the Revisor of Statutes).
208. Id.
209. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-9 (West, Westlaw through emergency legislation through Ch. 3
of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 55th Leg. (2021)).
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Replacement statutes would likely be the most effective form of
Elector-binding statutes for NPV states because they combine the
deterrent nature of Penalty statutes with the last resort of actually being
removed from office. If a potential Elector is aware in advance that a
faithless vote results in removal from the office, the person will most
likely either choose not to be an Elector at all or will commit to vote
for the national popular vote winner as required. In the event that an
Elector is not sufficiently deterred by the statute itself and the prospect
of removal, choosing to cast a faithless vote regardless, their vote will
not count and the Elector will be replaced with someone who will vote
faithfully. States could ensure that any replacement Elector will
assuredly vote for the national popular vote winner. Additionally, the
NPV organization endorsed the UFPEA as a potential option states
could use in 2011, indicating that the organization itself believes that
Replacement statutes would ensure the NPV would be able to work
properly.210 Thus, Replacement statutes would be the best option to
bind presidential Electors and allow the NPV to operate effectively.
B. Appointment of Electors, Political Parties, and the NPV
Not long after the creation of the Electoral College and
ratification of the U.S. Constitution, political parties were entangled
in the Electoral process, despite initial intentions to keep the Electoral
College non-partisan.211 Today, parties remain heavily involved in the
process. The Electors themselves, as they have been since the near
beginning of the Electoral College, are often party members who are
rewarded for their loyalties to the party with the Elector position.212
Even beyond the practices of the parties themselves, states statutorily
prescribe the role of the political parties in the Electoral process. The
parties each must provide to the state a slate of Electors who will cast
their votes in the event that party’s candidate wins the popular vote in
the state.213
210. Supreme Court Unanimously Rules that States May Require Presidential Electors to be
Faithful, supra note 187 (“In 2011, the National Popular Vote organization endorsed the ‘Uniform
Faithful Presidential Electors Act . . .’ written by the Uniform Law Commission in 2010. The
Supreme Court decision makes clear that the Uniform Law Commission’s proposed law is
constitutional.”).
211. Robb, supra note 1, at 436.
212. Id. at 436–37; Kyle Cheney, Who Are the Electors?, POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2016, 12:57 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/electoral-college-electors-232791.
213. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.30.020 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 32 and Ballot
Measure 2 of the 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of the 31st Leg.) (“Each political party shall select a number
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While the incorporation of the political parties into the process
makes practical sense, as party-nominated Electors would
theoretically represent the will of the people who voted for their party
candidate, the occurrence of faithless Electors illustrates that this is
not always the case. In increasingly polarized elections, including
contested primaries like the 2016 Democratic Primary that have the
potential to fracture the political parties, involving the political parties
so heavily makes less sense today.214 Particularly if the NPV were
enacted into law by a sufficient number of states, the political parties
likely can and should be cut out of the process to further ensure faithful
votes for the national popular vote winner.
The current mechanics of many state Elector-appointment laws,
requiring each political party to appoint a slate of Electors to be called
upon to vote if their party’s candidate wins, can be amended to cut the
political parties out. Pennsylvania’s statute, for example, requires the
candidates themselves to appoint the Electors, rather than the political
parties.215 The statute describes that the “nominee of each political
party for the office of President of the United States shall . . . nominate
as many persons to be the candidates of his party for the office of
presidential elector as the State is then entitled to.”216 In theory, a
statute like Pennsylvania’s would result in Electors who are more loyal
to the candidates themselves rather than merely the parties, and thus
more likely to vote for the candidate who nominated them.
Statutes like Pennsylvania’s would also work under the NPV. The
text of the NPV bill provides that “the presidential elector certifying
official of each member state shall certify the appointment in that
official's own state of the elector slate nominated in that state in

of candidates for electors of President and Vice-President of the United States equal to the number
of senators and representatives to which the state is entitled in Congress. The candidates for electors
shall be selected by the state party convention or in any other manner prescribed by the bylaws of
the party. The chairperson and secretary of the state convention or any other party official
designated by the party bylaws shall certify a list of the names of candidates for electors to the
director on or before September 1 in presidential election years.”).
214. Cheney, supra note 212 (“But the most important factor—and the one contributing to
recent unrest—is the fact that many electors were selected in the heat of a divisive and protracted
2016 primary season. As a result, elector slates in many states were packed with supporters of
Bernie Sanders and Ted Cruz, many of whom were left embittered by the outcome of divisive
primaries.”).
215. 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2878 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. Act
1).
216. Id.
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association with the national popular vote winner.”217 The statute does
not further clarify what “association with the national popular vote
winner” means.218 The explanation of the bill on the National Popular
Vote website includes references to the political party’s slate, but there
does not appear to be anything in the text of the bill itself that prevents
candidates themselves from nominating their Elector slate in each
state.219
Statutes like Pennsylvania’s, that rely on presidential candidate
vetting of Elector candidates, are likely more effective for ensuring the
NPV’s workability than an Honor System statute. These statutes can
also be combined with Replacement or Penalty statutes to ensure
faithful votes. With the combination of statutes, states all but
guarantee that Electors who are appointed support the national popular
vote winner, and if for some reason they do not and vote faithlessly,
they will be removed or penalized.
Finally, state governments could entirely cut both political parties
and candidates out of the Electoral appointment process. The states
could appoint a slate of Electors, without any personal or party loyalty
involved. These Electors could be nominated in a non-partisan or
multi-partisan fashion, or these Electors could include state
government officials. The Elector slates would be appointed prior to
an election. In order for this to work, though, states would need proper
Elector-binding statutes in place. Replacement statutes would be the
most effective in this instance, as Penalty statutes could allow party
loyalists to incur penalties in order to vote for another candidate. With
Replacement statutes, state government appointment of Electors
would be even better than Pennsylvania’s approach. There is no
necessary reason for political parties to be statutorily included under
this system, and this could potentially open the door to allow third
party candidates to win presidential elections. Removing the political
parties from the statutorily-prescribed process may help preserve the
integrity of presidential elections.

217. See KOZA ET AL., supra note 4, at 259.
218. Id.
219. Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE,
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/bill-text (last visited Mar. 14, 2021) (“[I]f, for example, the
Republican presidential slate is the national popular vote winner, the presidential electors
nominated by the Republican Party in all states belonging to the compact would win election as
members of the Electoral College in those states.”).
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CONCLUSION
The increasingly polarizing nature of U.S. presidential elections
has come to a head in recent years, and with only seventy-four
remaining electoral votes needed to put it in motion, the National
Popular Vote Plan is gaining traction in many states.220 The NPV, if
enacted, has the potential to make individual voters’ votes count more,
rather than having to be translated through a political party figure who
may or may not vote with the will of the people. Now that the Supreme
Court has decided that state Elector-binding statutes with enforcement
mechanisms are constitutionally permissible, in order to ensure that
the NPV can work, states in the NPV need to uniformly implement
Replacement or Penalty statutes. Additionally, given the existence of
and the ability for states to enact such statutes, the political parties can
be taken out of the electoral appointment process to ensure the
integrity of presidential elections and potentially neutralize some of
the sharp partisanship in the U.S.

220. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, supra note 22.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1. HONOR SYSTEM STATUTES
STATE

CITATION

Alabama

ALA. CODE § 1714-31

TEXT OF
STATUTE
Each person so listed
[as an Elector] shall
execute the following
statement which shall
be attached to the
certificate or petition
when the same is
filed with the
Secretary of State: “I
do hereby consent
and do hereby agree
to serve as elector for
President and Vice
President of the
United States, if
elected to that
position, and do
hereby agree that, if
so elected, I shall cast
my ballot as such
Elector for ________
for President and
________ for Vice
President of the
United States”
(inserting in the blank
spaces the respective
names of the persons
named as nominees
for the respective
offices in the
certificate to which
this statement is
attached).
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ALASKA STAT.
ANN. §§ 15.30.04,
15.30.090
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§ 15.30.040: The
party shall require
from each candidate
for elector a pledge
that as an elector the
person will vote for
the candidates
nominated by the
party of which the
person is a candidate.
§ 15.30.090: After
any vacancies have
been filled, the
electors shall proceed
to cast their votes for
the candidates for the
office of President
and Vice-President of
the party that selected
them as candidates
for electors . . . and
shall perform the
duties of electors as
required by the
constitution and laws
of the United States.
CONN. GEN. STAT. Each such elector
§ 9-176
shall cast his ballots
for the candidates
under whose names
he ran on the official
election ballot, as
provided in section 9175. If any such
elector is absent or if
there is a vacancy in
the electoral college
for any cause, the
electors present shall,
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Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 15, § 4303(b)

District of
Columbia

D.C. CODE § 11001.08(g)

[Vol. 54:1299

before voting for
President and Vice
President, elect by
ballot an elector to fill
such vacancy, and the
person so chosen
shall be a presidential
elector, shall perform
the duties of such
office and shall cast
his ballots for the
candidates to whom
the elector he is
replacing was
pledged.
In all cases, the
electors chosen or
appointed in this State
for the election of a
President and Vice
President of the
United States under
this chapter shall be
required to cast their
individual votes for
the presidential and
vice presidential
nominees, or their
legal successors, of
the political party that
nominated the elector.
Each person elected
as elector of President
and Vice President
shall, in the presence
of the Board, take an
oath or solemnly
affirm that he or she
will vote for the
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Florida

FLA. STAT.
§ 103.021(1)

Hawaii

HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 14-28

Maine

ME. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 805(2)

1333

candidates of the
party he or she has
been nominated to
represent, and it shall
be his or her duty to
vote in such manner
in the electoral
college.
Each such elector
shall be a qualified
elector of the party he
or she represents who
has taken an oath that
he or she will vote for
the candidates of the
party that he or she is
nominated to
represent.
The electors, when
convened, if both
candidates are alive,
shall vote by ballot
for that person for
president and that
person for vice
president of the
United States, who
are, respectively, the
candidates of the
political party or
group which they
represent, one of
whom, at least, is not
an inhabitant of this
State.
The presidential
electors at large shall
cast their ballots for
the presidential and
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Maryland

MD. CODE ANN.,
ELEC. LAW § 8505(c)

[Vol. 54:1299

vice-presidential
candidates who
received the largest
number of votes in
the State according to
the ranked-choice
method of counting
votes described in
section 723-A. The
presidential electors
of each congressional
district shall cast their
ballots for the
presidential and vicepresidential
candidates who
received the largest
number of votes in
each respective
congressional district
according to the
ranked-choice method
of counting votes
described in section
723-A.
After taking the oath
prescribed by Article
I, § 9 of the Maryland
Constitution before
the Clerk of the Court
of Appeals or, in the
Clerk’s absence,
before one of the
Clerk’s deputies, the
presidential Electors
shall cast their votes
for the candidates for
President and Vice
President who
received a plurality of
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Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 53, § 8

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 23-15-785(3)

1335

the votes cast in [the
State of Maryland].
Said acceptance form
shall include a pledge
by the presidential
elector to vote for the
candidate named in
the filing.
Each person so listed
shall execute the
following statement
which shall be
attached to the
certificate or petition
when it is filed with
the State Board of
Election
Commissioners: “I do
hereby consent and
do hereby agree to
serve as elector for
President and Vice
President of the
United States, if
elected to that
position, and do
hereby agree that, if
so elected, I shall cast
my ballot as such for
.......... for President
and .......... for Vice
President of the
United States”
(inserting in said
blank spaces the
respective names of
the persons named as
nominees for said
respective offices in
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Oregon

Tennessee
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the certificate to
which this statement
is attached).
OHIO REV. CODE A presidential elector
ANN. § 3505.40
elected at a general
election or appointed
pursuant to section
3505.39 of the
Revised Code shall,
when discharging the
duties enjoined upon
him by the
constitution or laws
of the United States,
cast his electoral vote
for the nominees for
president and vicepresident of the
political party which
certified him to the
secretary of state as a
presidential elector
pursuant to law.
OR. REV. STAT.
A candidate for
ANN. § 248.355(2) elector when selected
shall sign a pledge
that, if elected, the
candidate will vote in
the electoral college
for the candidates of
the party for President
and Vice President.
The Secretary of State
shall prescribe the
form of the pledge.
TENN. CODE ANN. The electors shall cast
§ 2-15-104(C)(1) their ballots in the
electoral college for
the candidates of the
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Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 2732

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN.
§ 24.2-203

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT.
§ 7.75(2)
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political party which
nominated them as
electors if both
candidates are alive.
The electors must
vote for the
candidates for
President and Vice
President who
received the greatest
number of votes at
the general election.
Electors selected by
the state convention
of any political party
as defined in § 24.2101 shall be required
to vote for the
nominees of the
national convention
to which the state
convention elects
delegates.
The presidential
electors, when
convened, shall vote
by ballot for that
person for president
and that person for
vice president who
are, respectively, the
candidates of the
political party which
nominated them
under s. 8.18, the
candidates whose
names appeared on
the nomination papers
filed under s. 8.20, or
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Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-19-108

[Vol. 54:1299

the candidate or
candidates who filed
their names under s.
8.185(2), except that
at least one of the
persons for whom the
electors vote may not
be an inhabitant of
this state. A
presidential elector is
not required to vote
for a candidate who is
deceased at the time
of the meeting.
All Wyoming electors
shall vote for the
candidates for the
office of president
and vice-president
receiving the highest
number of votes in
the Wyoming general
election.
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TABLE 2. REPLACEMENT STATUTES
STATE
Arizona

Colorado

CITATION
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-212

TEXT OF STATUTE
§ 16-212(B): After the
secretary of state issues the
statewide canvass containing
the results of a presidential
election, the presidential
electors of this state shall cast
their electoral college votes for
the candidate for president and
the candidate for vice
president who jointly received
the highest number of votes in
this state as prescribed in the
canvass.
§ 16-212(C): A presidential
elector who knowingly refuses
to cast that elector’s electoral
college vote as prescribed in
subsection B of this section is
no longer eligible to hold the
office of presidential Elector
and that office is deemed and
declared vacant by operation
of law. The chairperson of the
state committee of the political
party represented by that
elector shall appoint a person
who is otherwise qualified to
be a presidential elector. The
replacement presidential
elector shall cast the elector’s
electoral college vote as
prescribed by this section.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-304(1): The presidential
ANN. § 1-4-304 electors shall convene at the
capital of the state, in the
office of the governor at the
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UNIFORM
FAITHFUL
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORS ACT,
IND. CODE §§ 310-4-1.7(a), 3-104-9(d)

[Vol. 54:1299

capitol building, on the first
Monday after the second
Wednesday in the first
December following their
election at the hour of 12 noon
and take the oath required by
law for presidential electors. If
any vacancy occurs in the
office of a presidential elector
because of death, refusal to
act, absence, or other cause,
the presidential electors
present shall immediately
proceed to fill the vacancy in
the electoral college. When all
vacancies have been filled, the
presidential electors shall
proceed to perform the duties
required of them by the
constitution and laws of the
United States.
§ 1-4-304(5): Each presidential
elector shall vote for the
presidential candidate and, by
separate ballot, vicepresidential candidate who
received the highest number of
votes at the preceding general
election in this state.
§ 3-10-4-1.7(a): Each
presidential elector nominee
and each alternate presidential
elector nominee of a political
party shall execute the
following pledge: “If selected
for the office of presidential
elector, I agree to serve and to
mark my ballots for President
and Vice President for the
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nominees for those offices of
the party that nominated me.”

Iowa

§ 3-10-4-9(d): A presidential
elector who refuses to present
a ballot, presents an unmarked
ballot, or presents a ballot
marked in violation of the
presidential elector’s pledge
executed under section 1.7 or
8(c) of this chapter, vacates the
office of presidential elector.
The vacant presidential elector
office shall be filled as
provided in section 8 of this
chapter.
IOWA CODE § 54.8 § 54.8(2): Except as otherwise
provided by law of this state
outside of this chapter, each
elector shall present both
completed ballots to the state
commissioner who shall
examine the ballots and accept
and cast all ballots of electors
whose votes are consistent
with their pledges executed
under section 54.5 or 54.7.
Except as otherwise provided
by law of this state outside of
this chapter, the state
commissioner shall not accept
and shall not count an elector’s
presidential and vice
presidential ballots if the
elector has not marked both
ballots or has marked one
ballot in violation of the
elector’s pledge.
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§ 54.8(3): An elector who
refuses to present a ballot,
presents an unmarked ballot,
or presents a ballot marked in
violation of the elector’s
pledge executed under section
54.5 or 54.7 vacates the office
of elector. The state
commissioner shall declare the
creation of the vacancy and fill
the vacancy pursuant to
section 54.7.
MICH. COMP.
Refusal or failure to vote for
LAWS § 168.47
the candidates for president
and vice-president appearing
on the Michigan ballot of the
political party which
nominated the elector
constitutes a resignation from
the office of elector, his vote
shall not be recorded and the
remaining electors shall
forthwith fill the vacancy.
UNIFORM
§ 208.43: Each elector
FAITHFUL
nominee and alternate elector
PRESIDENTIAL
nominee of a political party
ELECTORS ACT, shall execute the following
MINN. STAT. ANN. pledge: “If selected for the
§§ 208.43,
position of elector, I agree to
208.46(c)
serve and to mark my ballots
for president and vice
president for the nominees for
those offices of the party that
nominated me.”
§ 208.46(c): An elector who
refuses to present a ballot,
presents an unmarked ballot,
or presents a ballot marked in
violation of the elector’s
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pledge executed under section
208.43 or 208.45, paragraph
(c), vacates the office of
elector, creating a vacant
position to be filled under
section 208.45.
UNIFORM
§ 13-25-304: Each Elector
FAITHFUL
nominated by a political party
PRESIDENTIAL
under 13-25-101 or by an
ELECTORS ACT, unaffiliated presidential
MONT. CODE
candidate shall execute the
ANN. §§ 13-25- following pledge: “If selected
304, 13-25-307(4) for the position of Elector, I
agree to serve and to mark my
ballots for president and vice
president for the nominees of
the political party that
nominated me.” The executed
pledges must accompany the
submission of the
corresponding names to the
secretary of state under 13-25101(1).
§ 13-25-307(4): An elector
who refuses to present a ballot,
presents an unmarked ballot,
or presents a ballot in violation
of the elector’s pledge
executed under 13-25-304 or
13-25-306(3) vacates the
office of elector, creating a
vacant position to be filled
under 13-25-306.
UNIFORM
§ 32-713(2): Each presidential
FAITHFUL
elector shall execute the
PRESIDENTIAL
following pledge: As a
ELECTORS ACT, presidential elector duly
NEB. REV. STAT. selected (or appointed) for this
position, I agree to serve and
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to mark my ballots for
President and Vice President
for the presidential and vicepresidential candidates who
received the highest number of
votes in the state if I am an atlarge presidential elector or the
highest number of votes in my
congressional district if I am a
congressional district
presidential elector.
§ 32-714(4): A presidential
Elector who refuses to present
a ballot, who attempts to
present an unmarked ballot, or
who attempts to present a
ballot marked in violation of
his or her pledge vacates the
office of presidential Elector.
§ 298.065(5): Except as
otherwise provided in
subsection 6, a person
appointed to the position of
presidential elector pursuant to
this section may not serve in
that position unless the person
signs a pledge in substantially
the following form: I agree to
serve as a presidential elector
and to vote only for the
nominees for President and
Vice President of the party or
the independent candidates
who received the highest
number of votes in this State at
the general election.
§ 298.075: Does not present
both ballots, presents an
unmarked ballot or presents a
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Utah

UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 20A-13-304(3)

Washington

UNIFORM
FAITHFUL
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORS ACT,
WASH. REV.
CODE §§
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ballot marked with a vote that
does not conform with the
provisions of subsection 1: (1)
The Secretary of State shall
refuse to accept either ballot of
the presidential elector; and (2)
The Secretary of State shall
deem the presidential elector’s
position vacant. The vacancy
must be filled pursuant to the
provisions of NRS 298.065.
The person appointed to fill
the vacancy in the position of
presidential elector, after
signing the pledge described in
NRS 298.065, shall mark both
ballots and present both ballots
to the Secretary of State
pursuant to this section.
Any elector who casts an
electoral ballot for an
individual not nominated by
the individual, or by the party
of which the elector is an
elector, except in the cases of
death or felony conviction of a
candidate, is considered to
have resigned from the office
of elector, the elector’s vote
may not be recorded, and the
remaining electors shall
appoint another individual to
fill the vacancy.
§ 29A.56.084: Each elector
nominee and alternate elector
nominee of a political party
shall execute the following
pledge: “If selected for the
position of elector, I agree to
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serve and to mark my ballots
for president and vice
president for the nominees for
those offices of the party that
nominated me.” Each elector
nominee and alternate elector
nominee of an unaffiliated
presidential candidate shall
execute the following pledge:
“If selected for the position of
elector as a nominee of an
unaffiliated presidential
candidate, I agree to serve and
to mark my ballots for that
candidate and for that
candidate’s vice presidential
running mate.” The executed
pledges must accompany the
submission of the
corresponding names to the
secretary of state.
§ 29A.56.090(3): An elector
who refuses to present a ballot,
presents an unmarked ballot,
or presents a ballot marked in
violation of the elector’s
pledge executed under RCW
29A.56.084 or 29A.56.088(3)
vacates the office of elector,
creating a vacant position to be
filled under RCW 29A.56.088.

TABLE 3. PENALTY STATUTES
STATE

CITATION

California

CAL. ELEC.
CODE

PENALTY

TEXT OF
STATUTE
$1,000 fine or § 6906: The
imprisonment electors, when
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convened, if
both candidates
are alive, shall
vote by ballot
for that person
for President
and that person
for Vice
President of the
United States,
who are,
respectively, the
candidates of
the political
party which
they represent,
one of whom, at
least, is not an
inhabitant of
this state.
§ 18002: Every
person charged
with the
performance of
any duty under
any law of this
state relating to
elections, who
willfully
neglects or
refuses to
perform it, or
who, in his or
her official
capacity,
knowingly and
fraudulently acts
in contravention
or violation of
any of those
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ANN. § 115-9
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laws, is, unless a
different
punishment is
prescribed by
this code,
punishable by
fine not
exceeding one
thousand dollars
($1,000) or by
imprisonment
pursuant to
subdivision (h)
of Section 1170
of the Penal
Code for 16
months or two
or three years,
or by both that
fine and
imprisonment.
Fourth degree § 1-15-9(A): All
felony (up to presidential
18 months in electors shall
prison and/or cast their ballots
a fine of up to in the electoral
$5,000, per
college for the
N.M. STAT. candidates of
ANN. § 31-18- the political
15
party which
nominated them
as presidential
electors.
§ 1-15-9(B):
Any presidential
elector who
casts his ballot
in violation of
the provisions
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contained in
Subsection A of
this section is
guilty of a
fourth degree
felony.
Any presidential
elector having
previously
signified his
consent to serve
as such, who
fails to attend
and vote for the
candidate of the
political party
which
nominated such
elector, for
President and
Vice-President
of the United
States at the
time and place
directed in G.S.
163-210 (except
in case of
sickness or
other
unavoidable
accident) shall
forfeit and pay
to the State five
hundred dollars
($500.00), to be
recovered by the
Attorney
General in the
Superior Court
of Wake
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OKLA.
STAT. tit. 26,
§§ 10-102,
10-109

Replacement;
up to $1,000
fine
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County. In
addition to such
forfeiture,
refusal or failure
to vote for the
candidates of
the political
party which
nominated such
elector shall
constitute a
resignation from
the office of
elector, his vote
shall not be
recorded, and
the remaining
electors shall
forthwith fill
such vacancy as
hereinbefore
provided.
§ 10-102: Every
party nominee
for Presidential
Elector shall
subscribe to an
oath, stating that
said nominee, if
elected, will cast
a ballot for the
persons
nominated for
the offices of
President and
Vice President
by the
nominee’s
party . . .
Refusal or
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failure to vote
by a Presidential
Elector for the
persons
nominated for
the offices of
President and
Vice President
by the
nominee’s party
shall constitute
a violation of
the oath and
shall result in
the immediate
forfeiture of the
Elector’s office.
In such event,
the vote shall
not be recorded,
a vacancy shall
be declared, and
the Presidential
Electors present
shall proceed to
fill such
vacancy as
provided in
Section 10-108
of this title.
§ 10-109: Any
Presidential
Elector who
violates his oath
as a Presidential
Elector shall be
guilty of a
misdemeanor
and, upon
conviction
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South Carolina

S.C. CODE
ANN. § 719-80

Criminal
action
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thereof, shall be
punished by a
fine of not more
than One
Thousand
Dollars
($1,000.00).
Each candidate
for presidential
and vicepresidential
elector shall
declare which
candidate for
president and
vice-president
he will vote for
if elected. Those
elected shall
vote for the
president and
vice-president
candidates for
whom they
declared. Any
person selected
to fill a vacancy
in the electoral
college shall
vote for the
candidates the
elector whose
place he is
taking had
declared for.
The declaration
shall be made to
the Secretary of
State on such
form as he may
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require not later
than sixty days
prior to the
general election
for electors. No
candidate for
president and
vice-president
elector shall
have his name
placed on the
ballot who fails
to make such
declaration by
the prescribed
time. Any
elector who
votes contrary
to the provisions
of this section
shall be deemed
guilty of
violating the
election laws of
this State and
upon conviction
shall be
punished
according to
law. Any
registered
elector shall
have the right to
institute proper
action to require
compliance with
the provisions
of this section.
The Attorney
General shall
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institute
criminal action
for any violation
of the provision
of this section.
Provided, the
executive
committee of
the party from
which an elector
of the electoral
college was
elected may
relieve the
elector from the
obligation to
vote for a
specific
candidate when,
in its judgment,
circumstances
shall have arisen
which, in the
opinion of the
committee, it
would not be in
the best interest
of the State for
the elector to
cast his ballot
for such a
candidate.
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APPENDIX B
NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE STATUS (AS OF NOVEMBER 2020)

STATE

STATUS

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Enacted in CAL.
ELEC. CODE
§§ 6920, 6921
Enacted and subject
to statewide vote in
November 2020
Enacted in 2018
Conn. Pub. Act No.
18-9
Enacted in DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 15,
§ 4300A
Enacted in D.C.
CODE § 1-1051.01
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Enacted in HAW.
REV. STAT. § 14D-1
Not Enacted
Enacted in 10 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN.
20/5
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

ELECTORBINDING
STATUTE
CATEGORY (IF
ANY)
Honor System
Honor System
Replacement
No Statute
Penalty
Replacement
Honor System
Honor System
Honor System
Honor System
No Statute
Honor System
No Statute
No Statute
Replacement
Replacement
No Statute
No Statute
No Statute
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Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

Not Enacted
Enacted in MD.
CODE ANN., ELEC.
LAW § 8-5A-01
Enacted in An Act
Relative to the
Agreement Among
the States to Elect
the President by
National Popular
Vote, ch. 229, 2010
Mass. Acts
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Enacted in N.J.
STAT. ANN.
§ 19:36-4
Enacted in N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 1-154.1
Enacted in N.Y.
ELEC. LAW § 12402
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Enacted by S.B.
870, 80th Leg.
Assemb., 2019
Reg. Sess. (Or.
2019) (not codified
as of this writing)
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Honor System
Honor System
Honor System

Replacement
Replacement
Honor System
No Statute
Replacement
Replacement
Replacement
No Statute
No Statute
Penalty
No Statute
Penalty
No Statute
Honor System
Penalty
Honor System
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Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Not Enacted
Enacted in 17 R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 17-4.2-1
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Enacted in VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§§ 2751–2755
Not Enacted
Enacted in WASH.
REV. CODE
§ 29A.56.300
Not Enacted
Not Enacted
Not Enacted

1357

No Statute
No Statute
Penalty
No Statute
Honor System
No Statute
Replacement
Honor System
Honor System
Replacement
No Statute
Honor System
Honor System
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